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RULES, STANDARDS, AND THE INTERNAL POINT
OF VIEW
Dale A. Nance*
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes presented his now famous "bad man"
theory of law:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.... The prophecies of what the court1 will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.
This view has had profound influence among strands of legal thought
otherwise as diverse as American Legal Realism and Law and Economics.
By some accounts, it has become an integral part of the dominant
2
instrumentalism of American legal thought.
But it is ultimately misguided. One of the contributions H.L.A. Hart
made to modem jurisprudence was to remind us of the importance of the
fact that many people in a legal system take what he called the "internal
point of view" toward its laws. Hart wrote,
At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, legal
or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on the one
hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules, and so
see their own and other persons' behavior in terms of the rules, and those
who, on the other hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the
external point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of the
difficulties facing any legal theory anxious to do justice to the complexity
of the facts is to remember the presence of both points of view and not to
3
define one of them out of existence.
This observation was part of a pointed rejection of theories, like that of
Holmes, which would filter out the perspective of the person who takes
such an internal point of view. 4 The relevance of Hart's observation has
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. For comments on a draft, I am
grateful to Peter Gerhart, Juliet Kostritsky, and Andy Morriss.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459, 461
(1897).
2. See Robert Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (1982).
3. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 90-91 (2d ed. 1994).
4. The distinction between the internal and external points of view is a practical one,
relating to reasons for action, not a theoretical one, relating to the attitudes of observers of a
legal system, although one can (and Hart did) address a different distinction between a
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been confirmed by empirical studies indicating that there are many reasons
other than fear of sanctions that motivate people to obey the law. 5 Holmes
notwithstanding, it is hardly "pretentious" to recognize such a salient fact in
6
articulating a general theory of law and legal obligation.
Hart's analytical insight, however, only hints at an important normative
claim, one which is a running, if implicit, theme in the work of scholars
such as Lon Fuller and Friedrich Hayek. 7 The normative claim is that it is
valuable that people take this internal point of view, that the health of a
legal system qua legal system is, in no small part, a function of how many
of its citizens-how firmly and how consistently-take the internal point of
view toward its laws.8 That may seem obvious, but my preliminary purpose
here is to elaborate (in Part I) on why it is so. The general thrust of the
present discussion is that, in addition to its contribution to economizing on
enforcement costs, there is a connection between the internal point of view
and the aspiration to republican self-government: the greater the incidence
of the former, the greater the achievement of the latter, ceteris paribus.
This fact imbues the notion of a healthy legal system with a crucially
normative component that goes beyond, and need not be inconsistent with,
efficient social organization.
My principal, presumably less obvious, purpose is to explore (in Parts IIVI) how this normative claim may have significant implications for the
selection and use of particular forms of legal norms. Specifically, my
present topic is the "rules versus standards" debate. Although Hart wrote in
terms of attitudes toward rules, obviously the internal/external distinction
can be generalized to a difference in attitude about legal norms, whether
rules or standards, and we can consider the implications of the need to
nurture and sustain the internal point of view toward legal norms. I argue
that, under a realistic depiction of the social and economic conditions in
which legal norms are recognized, adopted, or promulgated, a fairly strong
case can be made for the employment of relatively definite norms ("rules")
over the employment of less definite, balancing or discretionary norms
("standards") in regulating nonofficial conduct, again ceteris paribus. This
sympathetic (or hermeneutic) theoretical understanding (in which Hart himself was engaged)
and a more behaviorist theoretical understanding of actors in a legal system. See Scott J.
Shapiro, What Is the InternalPoint of View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 3-7, 24-26, 178 (1990).

6. Elsewhere, I have illustrated the important implications of this point for more narrow
legal issues by using the internal/external distinction to articulate the proper way to
understand the difference between property rules and liability rules. See Dale A. Nance,
Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral,83 Va. L. Rev. 837
(1997).
7. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969); 1-3 Friedrich Hayek,
Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and
Political Economy (1973, 1976, 1979).
8. For convenience, I refer to "citizens" as the nonofficial subjects of law to distinguish
such people from those who are acting in an official capacity. I recognize, of course, that
many subjects of law are not citizens in the technical sense, but it will be unnecessary to
distinguish between citizens and noncitizen subjects.
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is because rule-based decision making by officials facilitates selfapplication of legal norms by citizens in a manner that more accurately
anticipates official judgment, which in turn is an important ingredient for
fostering the internal point of view among the citizenry and preventing
substantive injustice in the presence of those who nonetheless take the
external point of view. An important feature of this argument is the
recognition that the extent of acceptance of the internal point of view is not
fixed over time, but can be affected by many factors, including the form in
which laws are adopted and implemented.
To be clear from the outset, I do not claim that rules are always the
correct instruments of legal guidance. I claim only that rules are to be
preferred when the situation admits of their use, especially within a
particular domain of legal norms. That particular domain is the subset of
legal norms that are principally directed at regulating the conduct of
nonofficial citizens (or citizens in their unofficial capacity) and only
secondarily at regulating the conduct of officials in their review of the
conduct of citizens. To put the point more precisely, the more legal norms
are directed at citizens rather than officials, the greater the strength of the
preference for rules, ceteris paribus. Again generalizing from Hart's
terminology, one can refer to the context in which the asserted preference
9
holds as the context of "primary" norms.
I address only in passing the question of the choice between rules and
standards in governing the behavior of officials. In part, this is because the
issues in that context are quite different, concentrating on matters of intragovernmental management.10 In part, this is because it is unlikely that the
employment of standards can be wholly eliminated from a legal system."I
My claim is that standards should be squeezed out of a certain domain of
law, to the extent possible, even if they must reappear in some form
somewhere else. For similar reasons, I exclude the law of procedure from
the scope of my thesis. While it is possible for citizens to take cognizance
of procedural norms, lay citizens are not generally the intended audience;
procedural norms are primarily directed at officials and those quasiofficials-lawyers-who assist in the operation of the legal system.12
9. Hart distinguished between "primary rules," which govern the conduct of citizens,
and "secondary rules," which "specify the ways in which the primary rules may be
conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation
conclusively determined." Hart, supra note 3, at 94. Referring to primary and secondary
"norms" generalizes Hart's language to include both "rules" and "standards," as
characterized in later discussion.
10. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, MetaRules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807 (2002) (discussing the choice of rule or
standard in deciding the form of judicial review of administrative lawmaking).
11. See, e.g., Paul M. Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance,
6 Cardozo L. Rev. 947 (1985).
12. For a discussion of the role of rules and standards in one pocket of the procedural
world, see Dale A. Nance, The Wisdom of Dallas County, in Evidence Stories 305 (Richard
Lempert ed., 2006) (addressing the role of standard-based judicial discretion in the
admission of hearsay evidence).
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Thus, I argue in support of the quite traditional proposition that citizens
should be given maximum practicable definiteness in the laws that regulate
their non-litigation conduct. 13 If there is reason to defend this seemingly
unexciting proposition, it is that the proposition has been challenged in
recent decades from a variety of directions. Some challenge the traditional
wisdom as arbitrarily privileging the value of autonomy, thereby neglecting
altruism. 14 Others in effect challenge it as insufficiently sensitive to the
law's role in maximizing social wealth and the dependence of that role on
context. 15 Still others believe that sacrificing ad hoc flexibility to ex ante
predictability is a bad idea so long as the state has monopoly control over
the content of legal norms provided for citizens. 16 I will defend the
traditional wisdom against such challenges.
I. THE INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW, OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT, AND SELFGOVERNANCE

Corresponding to Hart's distinction between the internal and external
points of view, legal theory has long recognized that (at least) two quite
distinguishable purposes are intended to be served by law. One is to
prevent or rectify wrongdoing by individuals who are unable or unwilling to
internalize what the promulgators of law consider to be serious social
norms, to deal with the recalcitrant or "bad" person who takes the external
point of view toward such norms. This purpose corresponds to an
"enforcement" function of law. The other purpose is to provide guidance to
individuals in those contexts where serious social norms are contested or
otherwise uncertain, to resolve disputes over such norms for the use of the
law-abiding or "good"17but "puzzled" person. This purpose corresponds to a
"guidance" function.
The serious social norms that might require
enforcement may or may not be those that are articulated in law in response
to the need for guidance; some serious social norms are recognized as law

13. The indicated preference has ancient roots. Plato went so far as to opine that "unless
you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become
law." 2 The Dialogues of Plato 491 (B. Jowett trans., Random House 3d ed. 1937). Aristotle
was less limiting, but still endorsed a preference for rules:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal rule, whether
it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only in
those matters on which law is unable, owing to the difficulty of framing general
rules for all contingencies, to make an exact pronouncement.
The Politics of Aristotle 127 (Ernest Barker trans. and ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962). The
Roman law maxim put it simply, "Ius finitum et debet esse et potest" ("the law can and
should be definite"). Okko Behrends, Formality and Substance in Classical Roman Law, in
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modem Legal Systems 207, 215
(Werner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994).
14. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557 (1992).
16. See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 199.
17. See Nance, supra note 6, at 859.
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solely for the purpose of enforcement, not because there is serious
controversy or uncertainty about their social authority.
A "utopia of legality" would contain no recalcitrant individuals, no
persons who take the external point of view toward legal norms. In such a
world, however, there would still be need for the guidance function, relating
to the law-abiding. This need is occasioned by good faith conflicts on
serious matters of principle that must be resolved, however tentatively, and
by problems of coordination that must be resolved, however arbitrarily, in
order for life in a community to continue without conflict. To be sure, a
more complete utopia might not involve any such conflicts or coordination
problems, but in such a world there would be no need of law at all. 18 In
contrast, trying to imagine a society in which law's guidance function is not
needed, in which the law's sole function is enforcement, is difficult indeed.
Because any organized enforcement function requires guidance norms
regulating adjudication and the application of sanctions, only the simplest
of societies could sustain law that is pure enforcement. 19 Given this core
recognition of the importance of the guidance function to the point of law,
dealing with recalcitrants is, arguably, secondary and contingent, not to say
20
unimportant.
Already, my first claim-that it is valuable that citizens take the internal
point of view-seems at least plausible. If citizens turn to law for the
resolution of their disagreements, one would expect them to internalize the
law's resolutions. One might plausibly argue that citizens have an
obligation to do so. 21 And that is one sense in which one might say that it is
valuable that citizens take the internal point of view. But many citizens
may not see it that way. For example, a citizen may plausibly believe that
22
he has a residual right, perhaps a duty, to follow his own moral views,
or-less admirably-he may want the law to resolve his controversy with
others as long as the law resolves it the way that he wants it resolved,
feeling free to disregard the law as guidance if the law goes the other way,
attending then prudentially only to the risk of law's sanctions.
18. For an in-depth treatment of the implications of the need for authoritative resolution
of such conflicts among people of good faith, see Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The
Rule of Rules: Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law (2001).
19. Id. at 218-19; cf Hart, supra note 3, at 89-91. Hart, of course, argued that the

minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system include officials' acceptance of the
internal point of view toward the secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication.
See id. at 113.
20. See Gerald J. Postema, Positivism, I Presume?... Comments on Schauer's "Rules
and the Rule of Law," 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 797 (1991). Postema argues,
Law uses both of these devices [internal guidance and external obstacles];
sometimes one is more prominent, sometimes the other. But internal guidance is
(and, I would maintain, must be) the primary device. That is, it is characteristic of,
perhaps essential to, law to provide (or at least purport to provide) us with reasons
why we should act in certain ways.
Id. at 799.
21. For extended discussion of the issue, see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays
on Law and Morality (1979).
22. This dilemma is explored in Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 53-95.
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Psychologically, that some or many people may thus want to have their
cake and eat it, too, should be anything but surprising. How, then, should
the managers of our legal system respond? Should they care, and if so, how
much?
We have seen that law's regulation of conduct proceeds in two
paradigmatic modes, guidance and enforcement, that respond to two
distinguishable attitudes toward law, the internal and the external point of
view. Consequently, the question becomes, how much effort should the
state put into shaping conduct to conform to substantive legal norms by way
of cultivating the internal point of view, and how much should it put into
shaping conduct by way of enforcement? No legal system of any size can
hope to bring citizens' conduct tolerably in line with primary legal norms
relying exclusively on the threat of coercive sanctions, nor by relying
exclusively on voluntary compliance by its citizens. One can then speak of
optimization, reaching the optimal balance between these two efforts.
Whatever the optimizing point, one thing is plain:
Widespread
internalization of law's substantive norms reduces the state's enforcement
costs necessary to attain any given level of compliance, and substantially
so, if only because it multiplies dramatically the number of agents whose
efforts maintain and reinforce the law's substantive norms of conduct.
But that is not all. Perceptions of the law's substantive justice and
procedural fairness are important causes of citizens' respect for the law and
23
thus their adoption and maintenance of the internal point of view.
Consequently, a well-developed internal point of view becomes an
important proxy for perceptions of substantive justice and procedural
fairness, which in turn are important proxies (and sometimes determinative
of) actual substantive justice and procedural fairness. Of course, one may
say that the implication, for those who administer legal systems, is that they
should pursue justice and fairness, and allow the internal point of view to
follow in train. Certainly they should pursue justice and fairness, but aside
from the fact that proxies are sometimes more easily measured and targeted
than the value for which they are proxies, this view would mistake the web
of mutually reinforcing forces at work.
To see the point, imagine two societies roughly equivalent in all ways
except that, in one, the level of compliance is maintained by twenty-five
percent of the citizenry accepting the internal point of view, while in the
other, the same level of compliance is maintained by seventy-five percent of
the citizenry accepting the internal point of view. In particular, assume that
the increased costs of the (nonenforcement) efforts to maintain
23. See Tyler, supra note 5; see also Robert S. Summers, Form and Function in a Legal
System-A General Study 284 (2006). Summers observes,
In tolerably well-ordered societies, a major factor that influences addressees
voluntarily to act in accord with rules and other valid law is the general respect
they have for the law ....
[S]uch respect derives largely from the sense that
addressees have that law is for the common good, that particular laws themselves
are justified, and that the system of law and its manner of operation are acceptable.
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internalization in the second society are exactly offset by the savings in
enforcement costs, so that net governmental efforts and degree of citizen
compliance with primary norms are the same in the two societies. Without
regard to the justice of the substantive norms or the fairness of procedural
norms, which by hypothesis are the same in the two societies, are they
equally praiseworthy legal systems? I would say not. The latter is, qua
legal system, healthier than the former. To what may we attribute this
intuition?
Return for a moment to the idea of a utopia of legality, one in which all
citizens take the internal point of view toward the primary norms of
conduct. As Lon Fuller illustrated, such a utopia of legality can be
imagined, and the obstacles thereto can be analyzed, without assuming any
particular form of government. His allegorical monarch, King Rex, faced a
multitude of problems-such as lack of clarity, inconsistency, and
retroactivity in promulgated norms-in his well-intentioned efforts to create
24
even a minimal system of law for his undeniably law-respecting subjects.
This was an intentional conceit, because Fuller wanted to distinguish the
morality of law from the morality of political organization. Fuller believed
his arguments to be useful in assessing lawfulness in monarchies and
dictatorships as well as democracies. But in assuming that King Rex's
subjects took this internal point of view about law, Fuller was
(intentionally) passing over the important matter of the causal relationships
between political organization and the inclination of subjects to take the
internal point of view.
In a pure democracy, where the promulgators are the citizens themselves,
it is relatively easy for citizens to regard legal norms that reflect the
resolution of issues of principle or coordination from the internal point of
view. To be sure, there is the possibility that those whose view does not
prevail on an issue will lose the sense of self-governance and adopt the
external point of view toward the promulgated law, especially if they are
consistently on the losing side of debates about matters of principle. But
the collective aspiration, in accepting or developing such a political system,
is to achieve and maintain the internal point of view toward the legal
system's solutions to those problems that require collective action. Under
republican government, representation of the electorate by others opens up
more authoritative distance between the law that is promulgated and the
people governed by it, which makes it harder for the electorate to achieve
and maintain the internal point of view. Still, as in a pure democracy, that
is the aspiration. A sense of authorship becomes a wellspring of the
25
internal point of view.
24. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 33-38.

25. One can, of course, develop a theoretical account of legal authority and legal
obligation that does not necessarily depend on the idea of direct or indirect citizen
authorship. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, at ch. 9 (1980). But that
does not gainsay the importance of such a sense of authorship in cultivating and maintaining
the internal point of view.
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Fuller, however, perceived another, more subtle and thus more often
neglected way in which citizens can have a connection with legal norms
that cultivates and maintains the internal point of view. They can engage
their cognitive faculties in the application of legal norms to themselves and
others. They then make judgments about the lawfulness of their own acts
and the acts of others. This, of course, is simply one manifestation of the
fact that most substantive legal norms are intended to provide citizens with
guidance. Although direct or indirect citizen authorship, together with the
achievement of substantive justice and procedural fairness, rightly claim
pride of place in cultivating and maintaining the internal point of view, the
importance of the practice of self-application to a healthy legal system
should not be underestimated. This form of participation augments the
subjects' sense of "ownership" of (or "investment" in) the legal system
itself and thus their commitment to it.2 6 By the practice of self-application,
citizens cultivate an attitude of lawfulness that sustains and encourages
responsible political participation, which in turn further contributes to the
sense of authorship, and so on in a web of reciprocally reinforcing social
attitudes and practices. 27 Even in the context of criminal prosecutions,
where it makes most sense to say that the law often must simply "act upon"
persons who have already acted by committing crimes, there remains an
important value in engaging the accused in dialogue, premised on the idea
that the accused can be made to understandthat his actions violate the law,
if that is so. 28 This, of course, presupposes that the accused can self-apply
the law's norms, even if that requires the assistance of lawyers, juries, and
judges after the fact.
To return to my hypothetical pair of societies, one might well say that the
second society, the one attaining a seventy-five percent internal point of
view, will be subjectively happier just in the fact of the sense of ownership
described, or more successful as a social group because of the greater
commitment to a shared legality, or that these facts will generate dynamic
effects, augmenting substantive justice or procedural fairness in the fullness
of time. In these respects, the two societies are not identical, which would
seem to violate my ceteris paribus assumption. On this point, I care not.
Whether or not one monetizes (or "utilizes") the happiness, group
successfulness, or future moral benefits associated with citizens' sense of
self-government, my point is that optimizing enforcement costs does not tell
26. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 190-216 (1986) (arguing that such a "protestant"
idea of law helps to justify the law's claim to obedience).
27. Jules Coleman put it nicely:
The internal point of view, as expressed in public behaviour, creates and sustains a
sense of reciprocity: that free riding or non-compliance is subject to public
criticism, and so on. Stability, reciprocity, and mutuality of expectation are
created and enhanced by the behaviour exhibited by those accepting a rule from
the internal point of view.
Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the PracticalDifference Thesis, in
Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law 99, 120 (Jules Coleman
ed., 2001).
28. See R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 110-19 (1986).
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the full story if it does not attend to the various implications of
internalization beyond immediate compliance.
Much modem theorizing about law has failed to recognize the full
importance of maintaining and cultivating the internal point of view among
the citizenry. The "bad man" theory of legal obligation is perhaps the most
conspicuous failure in this regard. When Holmes gave his famous "bad
man" speech, "The Path of the Law," at Boston University School of Law,
he was advising students on the best way to think of legal obligation and,
therefore, the best way to advise clients. 29 As already noted, this kind of
recommendation has had profound effects on the legal profession. Yet, it is
hardly the best way to preserve and cultivate the internal point of view
among the citizenry to have lawyers advising clients by taking the external
point of view. Although tangentially relevant in what follows, 30for the most
part I shall leave this important issue to be addressed by others.
II. THE FORM OF LEGAL NORMS: RULES VERSUS STANDARDS
The nexus between self-governance and the internal point of view has
important implications for the choice about the form of legal norms
presented by the "rules versus standards" debate. The use of rules, I shall
argue, tends to foster and maintain the internal point of view better than the
use of standards. As a prelude to the arguments in that regard, this section
briefly reviews now-conventional understanding of the choice between
rules and standards.
I will take as primitive the idea that "rules," as normative directives about
conduct, are framed in terms of concepts that can be applied without
explicit reference to the principles or policies that might have motivated the
rule, usually by specifying operative facts that trigger the rule. Rule-based
decision making takes this capacity seriously. 3 1 Correspondingly, I take the
use of standards to involve recourse to justificatory principles or policies,
mediated by some form of balancing that does not specify in advance the
result thereof. The important difference, then, between the rule-based and
standard-based decision making, at least for present purposes, is that the
former involves adjudication in accordance with norms that specify in
advance, and with considerable definiteness, the results of the necessary
balancing, whereas the latter involves adjudication in accordance with a

29. See Holmes, supra note 1.
30. See generally Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise
in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545 (1995); W. Bradley
For a
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167 (2005).
consideration of the problem in the context of an important area of practice, see Cynthia A.
Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. Rev.
1265 (1998).
A Philosophical
31. See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules:
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991).
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balancing of competing factors in the context of the particular case by some
32
official after the occurrence of the events to which the standard is applied.
To be sure, a norm may be expressed in a way that looks like a rule, but
in fact operates as a standard. For example, the simple negligence norm,
"do not act unreasonably," appears rule-like, but the judgmental term
"unreasonably" might signal a balancing approach, although it fails (at least
on its face) to provide any factors that are to be considered in drawing the
balance. 33 On the other hand, if this legal norm is applied in a way that
incorporates and makes controlling established social customs about what is
and is not reasonable, then the legal norm operates as a rule after all,
provided the established customs are adequately definite. 34 For my
purposes, I mean a norm to be most "rule-like" when it eliminates all
normative judgment beyond the determination of operative adjudicative
facts specified by the rule and those operative facts are not framed in terms
that reintroduce an implicit, seriously controvertible, normative judgment.
This obviously is an ideal conception to which most practical norms can
35
only aspire.
As this last point suggests, and has been noted by others, we are dealing
here with a spectrum of legal methodologies, ranging from the most rulegoverned decision making, using "pure" or "opaque" rules, that are applied
without reference to underlying justifications, to the complete absence of
nominal guidance for the citizen that appears in the creation of a cadi
jurisdiction, in which an official is empowered simply to make the best
decision for all concerned as to any dispute within the indicated jurisdiction
that comes before that official. Between these extremes, one can find a
variety of decision-making forms, including "presumptive" rule-based
decision making (which accords significant but non-conclusive weight to
following the authoritative rule), rule-sensitive particularism (which seeks
to make the best decision all things considered, but-where one of the things
considered is the value of following rules), the use of rules of thumb (which
employ a nominal rule to point to their underlying justifications, but
otherwise acknowledge no independent reason to follow the stated rule), the
employment of multi-factored tests coupled with announced goals to aid in
reaching the proper balance of competing factors, the use of multi-factored

32. See Hart, supra note 3, at 127-30; see also Kaplow, supra note 15, at 560 ("This
Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinction between rules and
standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or
after individualsact.")
33. See Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 27-28 (2000).

34. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 64. This remains true even if the established customs are
(or at some point in time were) established by performing a cost-benefit analysis or other
form of balancing, so long as the application of the negligence norm is not the occasion for a
fresh consideration of the competing factors.
35. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 33-34 (emphasizing the contingent
relationship between factual form and determinateness).
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tests without an articulated goal, and so forth.36 To simplify the discussion,
I will refer generically to rules versus standards, or to rule-based versus
standard-based decision making, and draw a variety of contrasts that, if
necessary, could be translated for greater precision into the more
cumbersome language of a spectrum. No claim I make depends on a strict
categorical distinction.
I pass over the question of whether governance by rule is truly possible,
that is, whether rule-based decision making is, in theory or in practice,
distinguishable from standard-based decision making. I accept without
argument that there is a theoretical and often a practical difference between
the two, that the former does not inevitably reduce to the latter. 37 And this
is so despite the familiar facts that norms adopted as standards can become
rules as a consequence of the operation of the doctrine of precedent 38 and
that, conversely, norms adopted as rules can become standards by the
39
(perhaps pernicious) operation of the doctrine of precedent.
Granted these subtleties, long familiar arguments have centered on the
conflicting virtues of the "fair notice" function of rules and the tailored
justice possible under standards. 40 More recent commentary has focused on
the question of relative institutional competency and role differentiation.
Rules are understood to be crude instruments, almost inevitably over- and
under-inclusive relative to their underlying justifications, so that application
of the rule without recourse to those justifications predictably leads to
"justificatory errors," that is, decisions at variance with the result dictated
by a full and accurate consideration of all justificatory factors. 4 1 Rules are
nonetheless considered desirable when the lawmaking authorities,
particularly legislatures and appellate courts, are sufficiently better able to
draw the balance of competing considerations, even when addressing a
relatively broad class of cases, such that a net increase in such errors would
result from lower officials' attempts to engage in "all things considered"
particularized assessments in individual cases. 42
36. Most of these are summarized in a useful article: Frederick Schauer, Rules and the
Rule of Law, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 645, 647-51 (1991).
37. For arguments supporting this assumption, see id. at 657-63, 665-79.
38. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 577-79. Even more obviously, a statute that
promulgates a standard for conduct may be converted into a rule by the delegated authority
of an agency to promulgate rules that give effect to the legislative standard. See Hart, supra
note 3, at 127-28. For present purposes, such a norm is considered a rule, because our
interest resides in the behavior of the persons whose conduct is regulated, not the intragovernmental relation between legislature and agency.
39. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 26-27 (noting the potential effect of the creation of
indefinite exceptions to a rule).
40. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1694-1701 (discussing these and other
considerations).
41. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 31-34. In principle, and to a limited extent in
practice, a rule can be made increasingly complex so that over- and under-inclusion are
reduced. See id. at 155-56; Kaplow, supra note 15, at 586-96. Such "complexification,"
however, carries with it many (though not all) of the difficulties associated with standards.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for A Complex World (1995).
42. See Schauer, supra note 36, at 685-86.
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Conventional law and economics analysis has enriched this picture in
several ways. For example, it highlights administrative costs, with the
result that front-loading the administrative costs associated with rule-based
decision making will tend to be optimal, ceteris paribus, in contexts where
much of the same kind of dispute recurs frequently. The back-loaded costs
of standards-based decision making will tend, ceteris paribus, to be optimal
when factual heterogeneity across a class of regulated activity, including
variation over time, makes particularized norm adaptation useful. 4 3 More
important for our purposes, economic analysts have encouraged us to
emphasize the effect of the choice between rules and standards on the
behavior of citizens governed by the norms. This extends not only to the
behavior of individuals whose relationship is governed by rules or standards
(what I will call the "interactional" context), but also to the context in which
one or both of those individuals considers transferring the entitlement
governed by the rule or standard to another (what I will call the
"transactional" context).
I will make reference to the prevailing wisdom on these matters in what
follows, but for the moment suffice it to say that no general preference for
rules or standards seems to have emerged from such analyses. Surveying
the literature, Russell Korobkin has concluded interestingly that no metarule emerges from the conventional law and economics analysis, only a set
of factors that generate a meta-standard to be applied to each context in
which the choice of rules or standards is to be made. 44 Korobkin goes on to
argue that even a more nuanced behavioral analysis, with attention to the
ways that people do not act as rational economic maximizers, fails to yield
45
a clear preference for rules or for standards.
My thesis is that we can say something more definite than this, once the
contingent, but nonetheless clearly identifiable, facts of our common reality
and our aspirations to self-government are taken into account.
III. RULES, STANDARDS, AND SELF-GOVERNANCE: A FIRST LOOK

The use of standards can be criticized as involving inherent delegation of
lawmaking authority to the decision maker employing the standard-that is,
mostly judges, particularly trial judges. Like all delegations of lawmaking
authority, this is viewed skeptically by those who consider legislatures the
more democratically responsible authorities.4 6 This idea borders on what I
43. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 15, at 585.
44. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 42-43.
45. Id. at 58. This agnosticism or ambivalence is not limited to those who approach the
question from the perspective of law and economics. Not surprisingly, critical legal theorists
have concluded that the appropriate policy choice is even more starkly indeterminate. See
Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 15-63 (1987).
46. Representative of this view is the jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176 (1989).
To be sure, Scalia's main concern in that article was the relationship between appellate
courts and lower courts, to which the democratic accountability issue becomes less salient,
as he recognized. Id. at 1176-77. Scalia's further arguments attempt to justify his resistance
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want to discuss, but I am not concerned here with the question of
democratic accountability as a matter of moral philosophy. Instead, I want
to focus on the effects of the choice of modality on the attitude of the
citizenry as it encounters legal norms that may apply to the citizens'
conduct.
There are two ways that the use of standards complicates and, under
plausible empirical assumptions, attenuates the sense of self-governance.
First, in rough parallel with the accountability argument, delegation of
lawmaking authority to lower level officials creates unnecessary distance
between the elected authors of law and the law as actually applied and,
therefore, between the electors and the law as actually applied. This
arguably dilutes the electorate's sense of authorship of the laws it
encounters, which in turn may have a detrimental effect on citizens' ability
to take the internal view toward law. While there is probably some truth in
this claim, it is difficult to imagine that the degree of acceptance of an
internal point of view toward law's norms among the citizenry in any
sizeable modern society is significantly affected by the fact that the norms
are articulated with specificity by elected representatives, themselves fairly
distant from the citizenry, rather than officials to whom those elected
officials delegate, with greater or lesser guidance, the responsibility to
fashion the norms.
The second phenomenon is somewhat more subtle but, I believe,
ultimately more significant. It concerns not the citizen's connection to the
making of law, but rather the citizen's connection to the application of law.
Interestingly, when one focuses on application, it would seem that using
standards would be more compatible (than using rules) with the selfgovernance that is our republican aspiration. After all, a person to whom
the standard is addressed, by being required to engage the assessment of
principles and policies and the balance of competing considerations,
participates in the law-applying process.
Such participation should
contribute to a sense of self-governance, even if the subject does not feel
close to the process of the standard's authorship. To the extent that the
application of general standards involves delegated lawmaking activity, the
subject participates in that activity at the very point of its application.
But any general preference for standards would entail serious problems.
By effectively delegating much of the lawmaking functions to the citizenry,
promulgators of standards to that extent abandon the task for which lawabiding citizens have need of law. The more standard-like a norm is, the
more it fails to give guidance to citizens about the resolution of those
conflicts and disagreements that citizens need resolved by law; at least it
fails to do so at the moments of action when they need such matters

to balancing tests and discretion (i.e., standards) and his preference for rules, a preference
that is reflected in his judicial opinions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 93133 (1997).
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resolved. 47 Arguably, widespread use of standards undermines the
reciprocity between government and the governed that is an important
4 8 Of
moral foundation of both the duty of obedience and the right to rule.
course, just as citizens may have no difficulty refusing to abide by law's
resolutions, despite an arguable moral obligation of obedience, so too the
promulgators of law may fail to honor an arguably reciprocal commitment
to resolve such issues definitely. They may cite the administrative costs of
developing sound rules, for example. And they might be right-that is, any
particular choice of a standard might not simply be a pretext for avoiding
the hard work of formulating good rules. Nevertheless, a variety of
practical counterarguments, ones that may have stronger appeal to
lawmakers than the moral reciprocity argument, give further support for a
preference for rules.
The following sections lay out these
counterarguments.
IV. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: THE INTERACTIONAL CONTEXT

I begin with the assumption-which will be relaxed in Part VI-that all
citizens involved are inclined to take the internal point of view, if it is
possible for them to do so. With that assumption, I address first
interactional contexts, those in which citizens choose conduct in light of
existing entitlements; no transfer (including contractual modification) of the
entitlement is involved-because such transfers are prohibited, because
transaction costs are too high for such a transfer to occur, or because there
simply is no interest on the part of the parties in making such a transfer.
Here is to be found much of the law of torts and crimes, including the vast
array of regulatory offenses.
When given a rule, a citizen inclined to follow the rule can attempt to
apply it to his or her own circumstances. If the question of enforcement
comes up, the citizen can, and usually will, predict enforcement based on
his or her own application of the rule. For example, given a specific speed
limit on a particular road, the citizen will predict being stopped for speeding
based mostly on her own assessment of whether or not she exceeds that
speed limit. 49 Obligation is perceived first, enforcement is predicted
second. In contrast, when given a standard, when told for example to drive
no faster than is reasonably safe under the conditions or to balance
competing needs for safety and rapid transportation, a citizen will quickly
47. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 18, at 28-32. Personifying law as the lawgiver, "Lex," Alexander and Sherwin state the matter succinctly: "[I]f uncertainty and
disagreement about how moral principles apply in concrete situations are what give rise to
the need for Lex and Lex's rules, Lex's rules are responsive to this need only if they
themselves do not engender uncertainty and disagreement about their concrete applications."
Id. at 32-33.
48. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 38-41.
49. As this particular example suggests, the citizen may have to make allowances for a
pattern of partial nonenforcement, and this itself may generate some of the same problems
associated with standards. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1395 (2002).
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understand that the balance is a matter of opinion and, therefore, will tend
to assess obligation by way of prediction; the citizen will look to the
authority whose opinion about the appropriate balance will be controlling in
terms of legal consequences.
In this way, prediction will precede
obligation. 50 As compared to rules, this encourages the citizen to take the
external point of view. Reinforcing this tendency is the differential
disappointment and frustration that the citizen will feel if it is less likely
that his own assessment of the balance under a standard will match the
balance struck by officials than that his own application of a rule will match
official application of the rule. The following paragraphs explore why such
an increased interpretational gap can be expected.
As already noted, one of the important reasons that lawmakers have
recourse to rules is that the application of standards by inferior officials-trial courts, agency administrators, prosecutors--can produce judgments
regarding the balance of competing considerations that do not match closely
enough the balance that would be determined by the law's promulgators-legislatures or appellate courts, as the case may be. But by pinning down
inferior officials, promulgators also create greater predictability from the
point of view of those citizens whose conduct is to be governed. 5 1 While
the gap between authorship and application by officials is not unimportant
in terms of the incidence of justificatory errors, the potential for a gap
between the applying officials and the law's subjects is more important in
regard to citizens' sense of self-government.
First, the officials who make and apply law are generally drawn from a
class of people-lawyers--who tend to share social, educational, and
vocational experiences, a shared background that can be expected to
generate greater homogeneity of response to the problem of applying the
balancing tests, or other forms of discretion, that characterize standards. In
contrast, the overwhelming majority of citizens do not generally share that
professional culture, which will cause a gap between citizen and official
application of standards. 52 Such mismatches lead to disappointment and

50. Cf Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property

Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 23-24 (1985) ("Mechanical rules... are predictable and
relatively inexpensive to apply: generally speaking, they can be applied by laymen with
little or no input from lawyers or judges ....

In contrast, judgmental rules ...

are

unpredictable and relatively expensive to apply. Judgmental rules require a large input of
legal advice and possibly even a judicial trial (or legislative or administrative action) before
the assignment of property rights can be established."); see also id. at 19 n.28 (noting that
what Merrill calls "judgmental rules" are often referred to as standards).
51. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 137-45 (discussing the value of rules in protecting
citizens' reliance interest).
52. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 34-35, 37, 48-49. The problem can be ameliorated
to some extent by the employment of lay juries when standards must be applied. The use of
lay juries supports the internal point of view among the citizenry in at least two ways: (1)
Jury judgment helps to reduce the gap between legal judgment and lay expectations, and (2)
juror participation in retail law-articulation and law-application helps to maintain jurorcitizen connection to the law.
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frustration when citizens find their disparate ex
ante assessments fail to
53
mesh with the ex post assessments of the courts.
Additional sources of disappointment and frustration arise from
pervasive bias of various kinds. The law's subjects generally find
themselves in situations where their self-interest will exert a powerful
clouding influence on their judgments, even if they are acting in good
faith-that is, even when they are attempting to maintain the internal point
of view toward the law's norms. This self-interest can and will be given
greater play in the context of the uncertainties in the application of
standards. 54 At the same time, adjudicators who are called upon to apply
legal norms after the fact are subject to their own sources of bias that have a
freer play in the context of standards. Personal or political agendas can
come into play when officials encounter the particularities of a case
governed by a standard, and this is true even if they accept the internal point
of view toward the standard to be applied. 55 Beyond that, a more specific
cognitive form of bias can be expected. An adjudicator's assessment of the
appropriate balance of competing factors under a standard is made in the
context of knowing the consequences of actions that, to the actors, were
uncertain ex ante. This "hindsight bias" will, for example, amplify the
difference between an actor's self-interested prediction of low risk and the
court's ex post assessment
of the risk of an action that is now known to
56
have caused harm.
The use of rules does not entirely eliminate the potential for mismatches
between the citizen's legal judgment and that of officials. But as compared
to governance by rules, the three factors identified can be expected to
increase substantially the number of such mismatches when citizens
encounter standards. Adding insult to injury, such mismatches will occur
53. The exceptional situation often noted is one in which the legal norm employs or
incorporates by reference a standard that has independent social meaning, such as a business
or social custom. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 577, 609 (1988) (discussing efficiency of a standard of "commercial reasonableness").
Rose's discussion presents what I have called a transactional context, concerning
transactions between merchants governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, but one can
imagine business custom being invoked, say, in a nuisance suit. As already noted, however,
the more factually specific or otherwise determinate such a custom is, the more rule-like
becomes the legal norm that incorporates it, in which case the situation is not in truth
exceptional. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
54. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 46. Risk aversion in contemplation of an uncertain
official judgment seems to cut the other way, inducing citizens to make a conservative
assessment of the scope of their entitlements, but there is no reason to think that risk
aversion offsets bias in each citizen, and for those in which bias and risk aversion are both at
work, there is no reason to think that the two effects roughly cancel each other. Cf id. at 3738.
55. Id. at 38-39.
56. Id. at 47-49. Like most heuristics, hindsight bias does not necessarily reflect an
irrational adaptation to the environment; it all depends on context. See Ulrich Hoffrage &
Ralph Hertwig, Hindsight Bias: A Price Worth Payingfor Fast and Frugal Memory, in

Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart 191 (1999). But in the
context of adjudication, hindsight bias can present significant problems. See Mitu Gulati et
al., Fraudby Hindsight, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 773 (2004).
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despite the greater time and effort that citizens must put into the task of
assessing the import of law's norms for their conduct, for one of the
advantages of rules is the time and energy saved by not having to conduct
the balancing of competing considerations at retail, that is, by each citizen
on each occasion presented. 57 Such disappointment and frustration, in turn,
can be expected to undermine citizens' commitment to the internal point of
view, driving citizens to take a more predictive viewpoint toward the
behavior of officials. In the extreme, there is the risk that respect for law
will transmute into manipulative supplication of officials, as citizens begin
to take actions that signal to the state that they possess characteristics
valued by officials, even when such characteristics do not relate to the
justifications of the particular legal norm. Especially under the flexibility
of standards, such characteristics might affect, and might be expected to
58
affect, official decision making.
Naturally, one must consider the potential to obtain help from lawyers
that can address these problems. For a variety of reasons, however, this
option will do little to dampen the indicated corrosive process that standards
encourage. Most significantly, a great many people are willing and able to
pay for legal assistance only in the most unusual of contexts; for other
situations, they will rely on their own assessment of the law's demands,
with the possible help of the word-of-mouth advice of mostly lay
acquaintances. Further, the costs of obtaining professional legal assistance
are higher in the context of standards, because lawyers must engage more of
their own energies in replicating the potential judgment of adjudicators.
Many citizens-more than when working with rules-will simply choose to
go without such assistance, at least until after crucial decisions that entail
59
legal commitments are made.
Even when, often after the fact when risks have matured into harms, legal
representation is seen as a practical option or necessity, the intense selfinterest that warrants the costs of representation will push the citizen toward
an external point of view. This is true whatever form the law's norms take,
but it is, I suggest, more dramatically so when lawyers are working with the
application of standards rather than the interpretation of rules. In the
context of standards, lawyers themselves can hardly avoid being driven
more toward a predictive standpoint, lest their assessment of the required
balance diverge from that of the judiciary. After all, clients do not consult
lawyers to get the lawyer's assessment of the competing considerations, but
rather to close the gap between the client's assessment and that of
officialdom, especially the judiciary. And although it is theoretically
coherent to imagine subjects taking the internal point of view toward their
lawyer's predictive assessment of judicial judgment, it is much more
57. See Schauer, supra note 31, at 145-49 (discussing such a cognitive "efficiency"
argument for governance by rules).
58. See Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y

101, 113-16 (1997) (noting the danger to the value of autonomy).
59. See Kaplow, supra note 15, at 562-64, 569.
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plausible that clients will take the predictive attitude the next step:
predicting the exercise of state power.
Despite the increased costs of legal advice, the employment of standards
rather than rules expands the range of legal questions for which the
assistance of lawyers and, ultimately, litigation are cost-effective, at least
for the relatively affluent. This drives up legal costs and increases the
frequency of the circumstances that, as argued in the previous paragraph,
will tend to undermine the internal point of view among the general
citizenry. 60 This may serve the class interests of the legal profession, but it
disserves the interests of the citizenry. 6 1 _Because of the association of the
legal profession with the law, this can be expected to do more than
undermine
commitment to law; it will tend to create overt hostility toward
62
it.

In the final analysis, there is little exaggeration in Hayek's observation:
The understanding that 'good fences make good neighbors', that is,
that men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their own ends
without colliding with each other only if clear boundaries can be drawn
between their respective domains
of free action, is the basis on which all
63
known civilization has grown.
Using rules thus encourages citizens to take the law into account in
choosing action, not only because they need to do so in order to achieve
their goals but because they can do so, at least they can do so more easily
than when standards are employed. And this fact can be expected to help
64
maintain and foster the internal point of view.

60. Perverse as it may seem, at least until the Holmesian bad man theory of law becomes
less influential among lawyers, one of the most important ways to preserve the internal point
of view among the citizenry may be to reduce the frequency with which they feel compelled
to seek legal representation. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
61. See Merrill, supra note 50, at 47, observing that
[g]enerally speaking, laymen tend to prefer mechanical rules, even if they seem
silly or inefficient, whereas spokesmen for the legal community-including
leading academics and judges-tend to prefer judgmental rules [i.e., standards].
This is as one would predict, assuming that laymen prefer private solutions to
resource disputes that minimize the demand for lawyers and litigation, whereas the
legal community prefers collective solutions that increase the demand.
See also Kaplow, supra note 15, at 620.
62. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 1-17, 25 (connecting public frustration with law and
lawyers to increasing legal complexity, of which the uncertainty associated with standards is
an important component).
63. 1 Hayek, supra note 7, at 107 (footnote omitted).
64. See Summers, supra note 23, at 156 ("Well-drawn definiteness furthers the rule of
law, especially in giving addressees fair notice of the law's requirements, in facilitating ease
and accuracy of application of law, and in securing like treatment of like cases. Other things
equal, definiteness also tends to render an otherwise well-designed law more respectworthy,
too.").
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V. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: THE TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT

When we shift focus from the interactional to the transactional context,
but retain the tentative assumption that all persons involved are inclined to
take the internal point of view, the balance of considerations still favors
rules. Conventional law and economics analysis recognizes that the clarity
of entitlements affects transaction costs: the clearer the entitlement, the
lower the transaction cost and the easier it is to make transfers. 65 This is
good, whether one views such transfers as serving autonomous choice or as
facilitating efficiency in the allocation of entitlements. Equally important
from our present perspective, being better able to achieve one's goals in
transactional contexts, however those. goals are defined, should better
66
reinforce citizens' commitment to law.
Nonetheless, it is generally understood that the use of standards might
contribute to efficient allocations in certain situations. The core insight is
that, in situations where consensual reallocation of entitlements to more
efficient users cannot occur, due to high transaction costs or strategic
bargaining behavior ("hold-outs"), then standards permit adjudicators to
assign the entitlement to the most efficient user ex post, when details that
affect the efficient allocation are more knowable, or induce parties to
67 It is
abandon strategic bargaining and consummate efficient transfers.
believed that the same result will accrue from a rule only if the rule
fortunately, if fortuitously, assigns the entitlement ex ante to the party who
will end up being able to make the most efficient use of it. But these
suggestions represent decidedly second-order phenomena, because the
conditions under which standards will work in this way are quite
demanding, and there is little reason to believe that lawmakers are capable
of segregating contexts in which standards will be more efficient from those
generally more common situations in which they will not, 68 and little more
reason to believe that law-applying officials have the competence to make
efficient ex post choices under standards. 6 9 Nor is it likely that the
65. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 93, 97 (4th ed. 2004).
66. See generally I Hayek, supra note 7 (explaining that citizens' commitment to
conceptions of justice are shaped by the evolution of abstract and predictable norms that
facilitate the achievement of citizens' diverse purposes).
67. See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 256 (1995) (modeling conditions under which standards will negate potential
hold-out behavior by less efficient users); Merrill, supra note 50 (explaining the usefulness
of standards in high transaction cost contexts).
68. For example, Jason Johnston conditions his result favoring standards on at least the
following assumptions: (a) The potential acquirer of a right to act has incomplete
information about the harm of his actions; (b) the potential efficiency gains of preventing a
hold-out are large; and (c) adjudicators systematically underestimate high levels of harm to
the person holding out. See Johnston, supra note 67, at 257-58. Note that, in order for the
standard to work efficiently, lawmakers choosing a standard must either be very lucky or
they must know, inter alia, that in the chosen context, courts systematically underestimate
levels of harm and yet they (lawmakers and adjudicators) must be unwilling or unable to
change that.
69. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 38-39.
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occasional efficiency gains, if any, from creating ex ante uncertainty by
using standards would be worth the more pervasive impairment of the
in providing incentives to conserve
ownership clarity that is so important
70
and develop resources optimally.
More importantly, from the present perspective, in these potentially
identifiable contexts in which standards might be employed to achieve local
efficiency gains, it is unlikely that the relative efficiency losses that might
occur under rules because transfers do not take place will be viewed by the
citizenry as an evil attributable to the law itself; instead, they will be
attributed to the unusually high transaction costs or strategic bargaining.
This means that the efficiency losses associated with rules pose no serious
threat to the maintenance of respect for law. 7 1 By contrast, inefficient
allocations by a court that erroneously applies a standard will very likely be
attributed by the affected citizens to legal failure.
These points are illustrated in the context of one particular kind of
impediment to transfers that has emerged in recent work on behavioral law
and economics: the endowment effect. Experimental research has shown
that (at least for some people in some contexts) the lowest price at which
the individual will sell an entitlement he owns is higher than the highest
price at which he will purchase that same entitlement from another. 72 With
regard to the choice between rules and standards, the argument is that this
supposedly irrational behavior suppresses transfers of entitlements and that
the increased clarity of entitlement associated with rules increases the
73
frequency or severity of the endowment effect.
There are substantial difficulties for this argument. It fails to distinguish
between the question of whether one is assigned an entitlement (which
plausibly determines the endowment effect) and the question of whether
one's entitlement is defined or protected by way of a rule or a standard
(which may not). Even if the choice of rule or standard affects the
entitlement holder's minimum sale price and maximum purchase price, it is
not clear that it affects the difference between the two for any given person,
70. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 67, at 273 (acknowledging the countervailing
importance of protecting incentives to invest in the object of the entitlement and the
relevance of clarity of ownership thereto). In a parallel fashion, the importance of such
incentive effects undermines the occasional arguments in favor of liability rules over
property rules. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2
Rev.
L.
&
Econ.
137
(2006),
available
at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context-rle;
Henry E. Smith,
Propertyand Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004).
71. The exception would occur when some separate legal norm is the source of the high
transaction costs (as, indeed, can be the case when a standard is chosen), in which case the
better strategy for the law would generally be to eliminate that impediment. Of course, there
may be good reasons not to let people achieve their goals (at least their immediate goals) by
alienating certain of their interests. If these inalienability norms are well considered and
have broad appeal, they should not undermine the internal point of view just because they
are constraints.
72. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990).
73. See Korobkin, supra note 33, at 51-53.
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which is what drives the endowment effect. In any event, even if the choice
does affect this difference, the argument fails to the extent that transfers are
valued because they effectuate autonomy rather than because they facilitate
efficiency. Neither party's autonomy is impaired just because they choose
not to make a transfer that would, unbeknownst to either of them, increase
their joint wealth. For the same reason, the failure of such transfers should
have little negative effect on citizens' inclination to take the internal point
of view.
Moreover, relative to the efficiency consideration (and more indirect
impacts it might have on citizens' attitudes toward law), it is important to
note that the endowment effect discourages transfer only under special
conditions that happen sporadically. For example, if Sa is the minimal sale
price for an entitlement when held by A, and Pa is the maximum purchase
price that A will pay for that entitlement, with similar definitions for B (Sb
and Pb), then the endowment effect (Sa>Pa; Sb>Pb) will prevent efficient
transfer from B to A (because Sb>Pa) when Sa>Sb>Pa>Pb or Sa>Sb>Pb>Pa,

but not when Sa>Pa>Sb>Pb. Even on pure efficiency grounds, attempting to
eliminate such second-order, quite possibly transient, 74 endowment effects
by clouding the question of entitlement impairs the ability of owners to
cultivate the objects of the entitlements and plan for their use in a world of
changing information.
So far in this section I have been discussing whether the problems of
transfer affect the choice between rules or standards for interactional
dimensions of the entitlement subject to potential transfer. A slightly
different set of considerations is present when addressing instead the
question of whether the legal norms governing transfer should themselves
be articulated as rules or standards. Here again, the conventional result is
that entitlement clarity, such as that provided by rules, reduces transfer
transaction costs and thus contributes to the achievement of private
purposes and the efficient allocation of entitlements. 7 5 And once again, this
can be expected to foster the internal point of view. To be sure, even if
standards control transfers, so long as such standards are waivable default
rules, there is no loss of party satisfaction or efficiency in contexts where
the stakes are high enough and the parties are sophisticated enough to
negotiate desired adjustments in the default rules. 76 But in other contexts,
74. The endowment effect may be only temporarily an obstacle to efficient transfer, if
conditions or parties shift so that the quantitative relationships change, for example, from
Sa>Sb>Pa>Pb to Sa>Pa>Sb>Pb or (involving a third person) to Sc>Pc>Sb>Pb.
75. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the
Transfer of Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984); Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal
Foundationfor Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1985).
76. Such default or "gap filling" provisions are in an important way quite different from
the mandatory rules that are the main topic of this essay. Gap filling norms are efforts to
complete the contract of the parties, and will often entail some notion of hypothetical
agreement. See, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 65, at 211-17. If the parties are able to
modify a default standard but choose not to do so, or if they choose to adopt a contractual
standard to govern their relationship, it is reasonable to infer that they prefer to be governed
on the matter by a standard. For a helpful analysis of some of the complexities involved for
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or when transfer standards are non-waivable, standards will produce the
same tendency toward predictivism and the same potential for
disappointment and frustration previously discussed. 77 Promulgators of law
will have a difficult task distinguishing effectively among these contexts,
although the possibility of successfully doing so cannot be ruled out.
One response to this kind of critique of standards is to suggest that
transacting parties will be able to insure against the increased risk of
mismatch between their own assessments ex ante and those of officials ex
post. 78 We may grant this, especially for sophisticated parties. But that
does not mean the law should ignore the opportunity to avoid causing such
insecurity. This is especially true in the present context, because relegating
citizens to insuring against unpredictable legal outcomes conduces to, if not
effectively endorses, the external point of view. When citizens come to see
legal outcomes on known or hypothesized facts as phenomena only to be
handled actuarially, like floods or automobile accidents, they lose the
connection that constitutes the
internal point of view; they are then engaged
79
merely in risk management.
All in all, when behavioral and circumstantial realities are incorporated
into a comparative analysis of rules and standards, a fairly strong case for
rules emerges, warranting a default preference for rules in regulating the
conduct of citizens who are inclined to take the internal point of view. In
most contexts, the factors that generate this preference-the cultural gap
between citizen and legal elites, expensive and risky legal redress,
predictable bias of various forms-are likely more important quantitatively
and qualitatively than considerations, such as differential administrative
costs, that would incline lawmakers to choose standards. Such a default
preference helps to remind lawmakers not to overweight the immediately
pressing administrative costs of promulgating rules, or the potential ex post
efficiency gains possible if a court acts competently and with social wealth
in mind, by excessively discounting the complex web of indirect, delayed,
and largely "off budget" social costs associated with standards.
contracting parties, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814 (2006). In such contexts, whether or not the parties' ex

ante confidence in courts is well placed, it is less likely that parties' frustration with the
resulting uncertainty will be focused on the law than would be the case if the law imposes a
standard on the parties.

77. For example, the doctrine excusing performance of contracts on grounds of
"impracticability" has generated remarkable uncertainty despite efforts to predict the
behavior of courts:
In spite of attempts by all of the contract scholars ... it remains impossible to
predict with accuracy how the [impracticability doctrine] will apply to a variety of
relatively common cases. Both the cases and the Code commentary are full of
weasel words such as "severe" shortage, "marked" increase, "basic" assumptions,
and "force majeure."
1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 3-10 (4th ed. 1995).
78. See Kelman, supra note 45, at 43.
79. See Nance, supra note 6, at 878-79 (discussing the radical separation of social
epistemology between manager and political community when a manager adopts the "law as
price" model derived from Holmes's bad man theory).
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VI. INDIFFERENCE, OPPORTUNISM, AND THE EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW

Until now, we have assumed that the parties involved have taken the
internal point of view, or at least were inclined to do so. Whatever the
motivating psychology, we have assumed this to involve good faith effortnot always effective, of course-to comply with the legal norm, whether
rule or standard, or at least to take that norm seriously as a (defeasible)
reason for action. Two important issues remain to be addressed. One is to
assess the impact of the existence of those who are indifferent to the law's
messages, at least until they find themselves caught up in the snare of
litigation or prosecution. The second concerns the problem of opportunistic
behavior, which is connected to the existence of those who take the external
point of view.
The first issue need not detain us for long. There will likely always be
some citizens who, for want of knowledge of or interest in the applicable
legal norms, pay no attention at all to such norms-whether rules or
standards-in determining their conduct, at least in certain spheres. 80 If
interactions among such citizens could be practically segregated, the choice
between rules and standards for those interactions might fall back to the
more agnostic, meta-standard framework described earlier. It is, however,
generally quite difficult, if not impossible, to tailor norms to distinguish
between such classes of citizens or between the contexts in which a citizen
will attend to the law and those in which she will not. Complications
include the fact that some such individuals take their behavioral cues from
social custom that is itself shaped by other people's expectations about the
law, so that individuals who pay no direct attention to the law may
nonetheless be guided in their actions by it. In the end, the advantages of
rules should not be neglected because of the possible existence of a class of
consistently or intermittently law-ignoring citizens. Law aspires to reduce
their number, and rules are more conducive to that end.
The second issue is more subtle. It has been argued that the relatively
bright lines that characterize rules provide people with information about
just how far they can go without incurring legal sanctions, often in defiance
of the purposes underlying the rule and sometimes knowingly taking
advantage of the rule's over- or under-inclusiveness. 8 1 To some extent, this
kind of opportunism is possible for both the good and the bad person, in the
technical senses we have been using for these terms. While good persons
take the legal rule as guidance, some may still feel entitled to "walk the
80. "Many men go on about their business with virtually no knowledge of, or attention
paid to, the so-called legal rules, be those rules certain or uncertain." Jerome Frank, Law and
the Modem Mind 35 (1936). Of course, Frank greatly exaggerates the significance of this
point, first by escalating his claim to one about "most men," and then by arguing from the
unstated premise that nearly all men ignore the law to reach the extraordinary conclusion
that "uncertainty in law has little bearing on practical affairs." Id. Few conclusions about
law are more profoundly mistaken.
81. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1695-96. The possibility of this kind of opportunism
may encourage people willing to engage in it to expend resources looking for potential
"victims." See Rose, supra note 53, at 599-601.
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line" in this fashion, although they will be less concerned with the question
of legal sanctions than with the terms of the rule violation of which might
trigger such sanctions. On the other hand, because they accept and
voluntarily cooperate in maintaining the rules, those who take the internal
point of view are more likely to understand rules purposively, which
presents the potential for interpreting the rule so as to violate neither its
letter nor its spirit. In contrast, the person who takes the external point of
view, who attends to legal rules only as signals or predictions that coercive
sanctions might be applied, is more likely to ignore a purposive
understanding of rules as well as any moral inhibitions about using
information about legal rules (including how and when they are likely to be
enforced) to fullest advantage.
So the problem of opportunism is
particularly acute in regard to the Holmesian bad man. The inference that
can be drawn from this collection of observations is that the flexibility
provided by standards can allow adjudicators to identify and sanction those
people who would thus act opportunistically, thereby protecting those who
encounter them in either the interactional or transactional context. This
flexibility, in turn, creates risk that will help deter people from such
82
contemplated opportunism.
There is certainly some truth in such arguments, but they mistake a tree
for the forest. The tree is that small set of encounters between citizens that
result in adjudication, the event that presents the opportunity for
adjudicators to achieve tailored fairness and to control the opportunistic
behavior described. Although, as noted above, it is likely that the use of
standards increases litigation, at least when stakes are high and parties are
relatively resourceful, we are still talking about a small fraction of the forest
of potentially litigated events. Focusing, instead, on that large set of cases
in which the parties are unlikely to seek legal advice, much less the
intervention of courts, the comparative advantage assessment is entirely
reversed. Citizens are more likely to be aware of and to comprehend the
demands of rules, and the relative reliability of an ex ante assessment of a
breach of duty measured by rules makes actual or threatened litigation more
viable for an aggrieved party in that subset of cases where a breach has
occurred; seeking legal advice and, if necessary, pursuing legal remedies, is
less of a gamble than it otherwise would be perceived. In contrast, the use
of standards presents the opportunity for bad people to push the envelope
even further than they would under a rules regime, content in the
knowledge that the ambiguity of the legal situation will continue to deter
those adversely affected from seeking expensive and risky legal redress. 8 3
82. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1773-74. The complex and contingent relationship
between altruism and the use of standards asserted by Kennedy is readily inferred from the
observation that rules can be used to achieve altruistic objectives. Cf Kelman, supra note 45,
at 54-63.
83. Courts have sometimes recognized this phenomenon. See, e.g., United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (holding that agreements, here among
railroads, to set prices are not exempt from antitrust prosecution just because the price set is
"reasonable"). The Court argued,
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Of course, this is more likely to be true in those contexts-vastly the more
numerous-in which the stakes are relatively small.
The likely impact of this phenomenon on the citizenry is complex, but
certain broad categories of impacts deserve particular notice. In a world
where legal redress is expensive and atypical, standards, more so than rules,
will systematically favor the interests of the relatively powerful bad persons
in their encounters with the relatively weak. 84 The former will be able to
take advantage of the tailored fairness of standards when they see a benefit
to be gained thereby, whereas the latter will see only vexation and expense
when faced with an aggressive or intransigent bad person who pushes the
envelope created by a standard's indefiniteness. Aside from (but in part
because of) the injustice that this produces, this is likely to alienate the
relatively weak from the legal system, which will be seen as serving the
interests of the powerful, that is, even more than when rules are employed.
And that will undermine the internal point of view among relatively weak
citizens. They will come to see the necessity of nonlegal forms of rough
corrective justice, which may entail retaliatory illegal behavior against the
powerful, especially if the perpetrators thereof can be confident that these
measures will remain "below the radar screen" of the law.
Repeated encounters between the comparably weak governed by
standards will generate a similar erosion of the internal point of view, but
for slightly different reasons. By decreasing the predictability of success of
legal redress and increasing the costs of litigation, standards again place
increased pressure on ordinary citizens to find modes of redress outside the
law, even when opportunism is not a particular problem. At least in the
context of repeat players, this can mean the development of informal norm
What is a proper standard by which to judge the fact of reasonable rates? Must the
rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to amount to a
sum sufficient to afford the shareholder a fair and reasonable profit upon his
investment? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit? ... [E]ven after the
standard should be determined there is such an infinite variety of facts entering
into the question of what is a reasonable rate.., that any individual shipper would
in most cases be apt to abandon the effort to show the unreasonable character of a
charge, sooner than hazard the great expense in time and money necessary to prove
the fact, and at the same time incur the ill will of the railroad itself in all his future
dealings with it. To say, therefore, that the [Sherman] act excludes agreements
which are not in unreasonable restraint of trade, and which tend simply to keep up
reasonable rates for transportation, is substantially to leave the question of
reasonableness to the companies themselves.
Id. at 331-32. Even Professor Kennedy seems to have been aware of this difficulty, though
he attributed little weight to it. See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1696 ("[G]eneral standards
are likely to be paper tigers in practice.").
84. By "relatively powerful" and "relatively weak" I do not refer to the overall wealth
and social power of individuals, but to their relative positions in a particular encounter.
Thus, a small business owner who does house renovations may be "more powerful" in the
context of such renovation work than the very wealthy customers whose houses are
renovated. Much of the power in such contexts depends on which party is more of a repeat
player in the particular context. On the other hand, this sense of relative power is probably
correlated with wealth and power in a broader sense, because of the pervasive reality of
customers purchasing goods or services from relatively large businesses.
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systems, which may work relatively well. 85 For the less moral, or less
cooperative, it can also mean increased resort to violence and other forms of
retaliatory self-help. Either way, one can anticipate a citizenry that finds
less confidence in its legal system, which can only undermine the internal
point of view.
Against all this, the improved ability of adjudicators using standards to
tailor justice and (perhaps) improve efficiency in disputes involving those
who act in ignorance of the law and in disputes between comparably
sophisticated parties over matters significant enough to make legal
representation cost-effective seems a meager palliative. It is unlikely to
have significant impact on the cultivation or maintenance of the internal
point of view among the general citizenry.
Notwithstanding my general conclusion, there is one important
clarification that is highlighted by the focus on opportunism. As noted
above, when considering only those who take the internal point of view, the
matter of sanctions is of little import. Norms that direct officials in the
application of sanctions speak almost entirely to those who take the external
point of view. 86 Yet the bad person can be expected to take advantage of
the anticipated gap between the directive of a guidance norm (whether rule
or standard) and that of an adverse judicial decision, as well as that between
an adverse judicial decision and real enforcement, that is, when the sheriff
arrives to arrest someone or to enforce a judgment lien. 87 Without
sacrificing the advantages of rules in the context of guidance, standards
have substantial advantages in the context of remedies and sanctions, where
their flexibility can be used to take account of this calculation by the bad
person-whose legitimate interest in predictability is minimal-as well as
to tailor justice for the good persons who, despite their efforts, end up
before the court. 8 8
This point is illustrated nicely in a comment by Frederick Schauer about
the context dependence of the predictability advantage of rules:
[I]f the sentence of death were imposed in accordance with accessible
rules strictly applied, people (including those contemplating committing
capital crimes) could predict with some confidence which acts would
generate the death penalty. That predictability, however, would come
85. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes (1991) (frequently illustrating the preference of citizens for simple rules).
Ellickson notes that, among the transaction costs that may drive citizens to nonlegal dispute
resolution is the cost of discerning one's legal rights and duties. See, e.g., id. at 281.
86. On the limited but extant role of remedies in handling disputes between those who
take the internal point of view, see Nance, supra note 6, at 909-17.
87. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 30, at 1279-80. These gaps will not be pertinent to
the good person's decisions about how to act under the substantive legal norm, but they will
be pertinent to the good person's decisions about whether to expend resources to seek legal
redress against a bad person for violation of that norm, thus contributing to the ability of the
bad person to take advantage of the good, regardless of the form of the guidance norm.
88. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in
Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 443 (2004) (arguing that uncertainty in
the severity of the sanction or the probability of detection can increase deterrence).
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only at the risk of putting to death some people who would live if their
particular acts were scrutinized in the full richness of relevant detail. On
the other hand, many rules involving the formalities of contracts, wills,
trusts, and real estate transactions are premised on the assumption that the
costs of a mistaken decision are comparatively minor, at least when
compared to the enormous virtues of predictability, without which few
contracts, wills,
trusts, or real estate transactions would ever be
89
consummated.
This kind of contrast might seem to concern only differences between law's
attempts to suppress wrongdoing and law's attempts to facilitate desirable
private transactions. 90
But equally or even more important in the
comparison is the difference between right and remedy. The determination
on the death sentence falls unequivocally within the remedial realm of
sanctions and enforcement, and the specification of factors is primarily
directed at officials rather than potential criminals, the overwhelming
majority of whom will never consult these factors in anticipation of
acting. 9 1 In contrast, the formalities for validity of contracts, wills, and so
forth, lie in the realm of pre-remedial rights, of widely used guidance norms
directed primarily at citizens and only secondarily at reviewing officials.
When the right/remedy distinction comes into relief, the illustrations in
the quoted passage support the use of standards in the remedial context.
Indeed, the passage may not go far enough in that direction, for it seems to
suggest (although this may not have been intended) that the person
contemplating a capital crime has a legitimate interest in predictability of
sanction. There is no need to balance ex ante predictability against ex post
flexibility in such a context, because there is no legitimate interest in
predictability.
Rather, the flexibility of standards at the point of
determining the sanction protects both the criminal who, on a nuanced
analysis of the situation, does not deserve the death penalty and the state's
ability to deter the occasional would-be criminal who attempts to "walk the
line" by choosing the details of his crime so as to avoid the death penalty or
who contemplates stepping over the line in reliance on the gap between
substantive norm and ultimate sanction. So long as remedial standards are
not set or applied in such a manner as to be incompatible with the guidance
rules they support, they pose no threat to the legitimate interests in
92
predictability held by those who accept the internal point of view.
It is indeed possible that much of the modem agnosticism or ambivalence
about the choice of rules versus standards can be attributed to a failure to
89. Schauer, supra note 31, at 142.
90. Cf Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1690-94.
91. An analogous point can often be made in regard to the guidance norms that specify

duties under the criminal law, but in that context there are other concerns that take
prominence, including the need to control, in a fairly visible way, the government's power to
wield the criminal sanction against even law-abiding citizens.
92. "[Fairness requires only] that there is sufficient warning to one bent on obedience
that he comes near the proscribed area." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 539 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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keep clear the distinction between rights (guidance norms) and remedies
(enforcement norms). This would not be surprising, because one of the
implications of the Holmesian bad man theory of legal obligation is just to
collapse the right/remedy distinction into one overall prediction of the
exercise of state power. If we reject this distortion of legal obligation and
attend to the dominant importance of guidance for the law-respecting
citizen, then we can see more clearly the important role of standards in
dealing with those who behave opportunistically toward guidance rules.
CONCLUSION

The development and maintenance of the internal point of view presents
an important, perhaps the most important, collective action problem
encountered by societies that would try to govern members' conduct by
law.
As Robert Summers recently stated, "Legally well-informed
addressees who voluntarily implement the law may be the most important
material components of any [legal] system." 93 This is not to deny the
potentially repressive downside of a widely accepted internal point of view.
A healthy legal system is not necessarily a just one, just as a democracy is
not necessarily a just political order. 94 Among other things, a just legal
system must make a reasonably good allocation between the public and
private sphere, between the realm in which citizens should internalize
public norms and the realm in which they are free to pursue private goals
subject only to whatever nonlegal normative structures may apply. In
response to those who see in a strong commitment to the internal point of
view the specter of authoritarian demands, with law as an instrument of
exploitation or repression, 95 it is important to emphasize that such a
commitment to the internal point of view is entirely compatible with any of
several different versions (on the political left or the political right) of a
commitment to keeping the public sphere small. Whatever the allocation of
decision making to public and private spheres, the role of citizens who take
the internal point of view toward law is critical to the success of the
96
enterprise as a whole.
There are, of course, many factors that affect the strength and extent of
the internal point of view among the citizenry.
One ought not to
underestimate, however, the importance of choices about legal form. When
93. See Summers, supra note 23, at 284.

94. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and
Abroad (2003).
95. See, e.g., Hasnas, supra note 16, at 217-19.

96. John Hasnas argues that the repressive power of the "myth of the rule of law," which
he associates with the fruitless search for definite rules, can only be avoided by ending the
state's monopoly over the legal system and introducing competitive provision of legal
dispute resolution. Id. at 213-15, 220-33.

It may be true that a more competitive system

could generate more just legal norms, but for the reasons articulated above, it seems likely
that "producers" in such a competitive system would work hard to provide definite rules and
eschew vague standards, whenever that is possible. Indeed, I suspect that it is the monopoly
power of the state that permits the rather luxuriant use of standards in modem law.
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Lon Fuller famously defined law as the "enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules, ' 97 he clearly understood the aspirational
nature of governance by rules. Much of his book, The Morality of Law, is
devoted to the difficulties that the ordinary subject of law has in finding the
clear guidance in legal.norms that justifies and psychologically supports the
internal point of view. What he also understood, even if he never quite said
it, is that the quest for rules as distinctfrom standards, whether or not it
defines the legal enterprise, is an important part of law's aspiration. In a
world such as ours, characterized by a cultural gap between lawmakers and
citizens, expensive and risky legal redress, ubiquitous bias affecting both
citizens and adjudicators, and regularly encountered "bad" persons who
take the external point of view toward law's norms, a presumption in favor
of rules is warranted in the context of guidance norms in order to nurture
the internal point of view. This is so because strengthening the internal
point of view not only contributes to enforcement efficiency, but also
cultivates a healthy sense of self-governance. Further, choosing rules over
standards to achieve these goods does not pose serious threats of allocative
inefficiency or opportunistic injustice; indeed, the rules are generally
conducive to allocative efficiency and the prevention of opportunistic
injustice.
This preference is in the nature of an advisory "rule of thumb." Put
differently, it is a principle for the creation and management of legal norms
by lawmakers; it is not intended to give guidance to citizens in the conduct
of their affairs, so it is not itself the kind of rule that it recommends.
Further, it does not recommend just any rule over any standard governing
the same subject. It might well be desirable, for example, to replace the
general standard of negligence with a series of negligence per se rules. But
that does not mean that this preference recommends the remarkably simple
and predictable alternative rule, "no duty to avoid, or liability for,
unintentional harms," nor the somewhat more complex rule, "death by
hanging for all unintentional harms." The preference only favors rules
plausibly accommodating the competing principles and interests involved.
To put it differently, among the factors that count against a contemplated
rule, factors that might outweigh the preference, is the fact, if it is a fact,
that the contemplated rule would yield results less just or less efficient than
the only available alternative, even if the latter is a standard. 98 Still, the
cumulative force of the relevant long-run considerations is such that we
should be quite reluctant to reject or abandon a plausible rule in favor of a
standard. When we do, moreover, it is generally important to provide rule97. Fuller, supra note 7, at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. A special, but important example of this dilemma occurs when legislation creates an
overbroad rule with potentially horrendous consequences and an interpreting court is forced

to soften the effects by injecting a qualifier that converts the rule into what might be a
standard. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 509 (1898) (affirming
that only "direct" restraints of trade are reached by the Sherman Antitrust Act's unqualified
language prohibiting "every contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy, to restrain trade or
commerce").
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based delineation of the subjects governed by rule and those governed by
standard, lest the benefits of the rules be lost. 99
A final and important caveat: To argue for a preference for rules does
not determine the exact nature of the interpretive methodology that judges
should employ in addressing hard cases arising under rules. A preference
for definiteness in legal norms obviously has general limits, the most
important of which is the quite predictable infelicities of verbal
communication. Like Fuller,100 I would certainly not deny the important
role of purpose in the interpretation of legal language. Nor would almost
any intelligent layperson, at least when presented with an example of an
obvious communicative failure in the drafting of the language of a rule.
Citizens will expect the legal profession to clean things up to some extent,
and this anticipation must be built into the guidance function of rules.
Citizens who expect rules to be interpreted intelligently deserve not to be
disappointed by excessive efforts to remove value judgments from the
judicial craft. Yet even that seemingly minor concession poses the
interpretive questions that have consumed so much of the time of legal
theorists in recent years. Obviously, I have not here attempted to adjudicate
among competing theories of interpretation. But to interpret rules, one must
have rules. The preference for which I have argued is simply one that
favors, in a general way, the rules end of the rules/standards spectrum.

99. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 50, at 31-32 (discussing the importance of a mechanical
test for determining whether a mechanical trespass rule should apply or a judgmental
nuisance rule (standard) should apply).
100. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 7, at 82-91, 224-32.

